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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1113 
___________ 
 
DA CHEN CHEN, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-255-881) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Susan G. Roy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 19, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 19, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Da Chen Chen (“Chen”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ (“BIA” or “Board”) denial of his motion to reopen.  For the following reasons, 
we will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
 In 2008, Chen appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) for removal 
proceedings and sought asylum on the basis of China’s family planning policy.  The IJ 
found his testimony lacking in credibility and ordered him removed to China.  The BIA 
dismissed Chen’s appeal in September 2009, and we denied his subsequent petition for 
review in Chen v. Att’y Gen., 392 F. App’x 946 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 More than two years later, Chen filed a counseled motion to reopen with the BIA.  
He stated that he had converted to Christianity in 2011 and that the Chinese government 
had increased its persecution of members of unregistered Christian groups between 2008 
and 2012.  In denying his motion, the BIA determined that Chen’s evidence neither 
established a change in country conditions nor demonstrated that he would suffer 
persecution upon his return to China.  Accordingly, the Board determined that Chen 
lacked a basis for filing his motion to reopen after the 90-day deadline had passed.  
Through counsel, Chen filed a timely petition for review.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we review denials of motions to 
reopen under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.1
                                              
1 Because we find that the BIA’s decision was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law, 
we do not reach the BIA’s alternative determination that Chen did not establish a prima 
facie case for asylum relief.  See Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 169-70 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing INS 
v. Abadu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (stating that the Board may deny a motion to reopen in 
asylum cases where it determines that “the movant would not be entitled to the 
discretionary grant of relief”). 
  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 
F.3d 166, 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  The BIA’s decision “will not be disturbed unless [it 
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is] found to be arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 
562 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).  A motion filed more than 90 days after the Board’s 
final decision cannot be entertained unless it “is based upon changed country conditions 
proved by evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been 
discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”  Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 
161 (3d Cir. 2011).  A renewed asylum application based on changes in personal 
circumstances filed outside of this 90-day period must be accompanied by a motion to 
reopen that successfully shows changed country conditions since the time of the 
petitioner’s first asylum application.  Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 Chen does not dispute that his motion to reopen was filed more than 90 days after 
the BIA’s final decision.  Instead, he asserts that the Board abused its discretion by 
“cherry-picking” the record to find that Chen failed to establish changed country 
conditions.  We have previously stated that the BIA is required to consider a party’s 
evidence of changed country conditions, and that it “should provide us with more than 
cursory, summary or conclusory statements, so that we are able to discern its reasons for 
declining to afford relief to a petitioner.”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)).  However, it need 
not “parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered 
by the petitioner.”  Id.  Here, the BIA reviewed, among the evidence that Chen submitted, 
Chen’s baptism certificate, documents from Chen’s church in the United States, a letter 
from Chen’s wife, news articles from 2011, and the 2010 Department of State 
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International Religious Freedom Report.  It then compared the 2010 International 
Religious Freedom Report to the Department of State’s 2007 country reports, included in 
the record from Chen’s previous proceedings, to support its finding that Chen’s evidence 
was inadequate to demonstrate the existence of changed country conditions.2
 To the extent that Chen argues the Board erred by failing to find the existence of 
changed country conditions, we conclude that the BIA’s determination was reasonable in 
light of the evidence presented by Chen.  The 2010 International Religious Freedom 
Report establishes that the practice of Christianity in China is restricted to churches 
registered with the government, and that leaders and members of unregistered churches 
have continued to face detention for religious activities.  This report also notes that 
“[s]ince 1999, the Secretary of State has designated [China] as a ‘Country of Particular 
Concern’ under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for particularly severe 
violations of religious freedom.”  (A.R. 63.)  See Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 
85, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (country reports described as the “most appropriate” and “perhaps 
best resource” on country conditions).  Furthermore, the letter Chen submitted from his 
wife detailing how she was detained twice after police raided her underground church can 
be viewed as an illustration of the continuous persecution of Christians in China, not as 
demonstrating a change in country conditions.  Based upon the evidence, the BIA 
plausibly concluded that restrictions upon religious freedom have persisted in China since 
 
                                              
2 We agree with the BIA that Chen’s conversion to Christianity constitutes a change in 
personal circumstances rather than country conditions.  See Liu, 555 F.3d at 150. 
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before Chen’s 2008 hearing.  See Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 161 (BIA did not err in denying 
reopening where “the conditions described have persisted”).  
III. 
 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Board’s decision to deny Chen’s 
motion to reopen was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Accordingly, we will 
deny the petition for review. 
